cyber intelligence, cybersecurity

INSA Cyber Intel Task Force Launches Cyber Indications and Warnings Project

Date: 28 July 2016

Author: Blake Moore

I am excited to work with Andrea Limbago and other members of the Cyber Intelligence Task Force at INSA on a fledgling research effort looking at cyber threat indications and warning (I&W).

The development of sound strategic warning capabilities in cyberspace is essential to U.S. national security and the security of our allies; I&W plays a significant role in that. Unfortunately, at the present time there is not a comprehensive understanding of how organizations approach I&W in the cyber domain. Through surveys and interviews with practitioners as well as executive leadership, we hope to understand how I&W processes and procedures compare and contrast across government, industry, and academia. By identifying key trends, best practices, and foremost challenges related to I&W, we hope this effort will result in insights that will empower organizations to enhance their cyber strategic warning capabilities and implement more proactive cybersecurity approaches. We will post updates here as the project progresses.

If you would like to learn more about the I&W project and/or want to participate in the survey, please contact us here!

About INSA: INSA is the premier intelligence and national security organization that brings together the public, private and academic sectors to collaborate on the most challenging policy issues and solutions.

About the INSA Cyber intelligence task force: The INSA Cyber Intelligence Task Force was created to set the landscape for cyber intelligence by discussing why cyber intelligence is necessary and providing thoughts on how to develop this function in the cyber domain.

 

Advertisements
Standard
Uncategorized

Social Media Threats – Part 2: Using CTI to Identify and Neutralize Social Media Threats

Date: 8 July, 2016

Author: Lincoln Kaffenberger

download

Picture Attribution: http://www.computerweekly.com

In Part 1, we discussed how social media based threats can impact organizations in ways many do not yet fully appreciate. The reputation and cybersecurity risks exist today and many organizations have little to no detection or prevention capability. In Part 2, we will discuss what organizations should do about this threat and how Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) can help identify and neutralize the social media based threats.

 

The CTI has an important role to play here. CTI teams should actively and passively monitor for impersonations, account hijackings, URLs in posts or comments that lead to malware, and reconnaissance activity as these can be indicators of adversary intent and capabilities. CTI teams should partner with anyone in the organization that is working with social media such as the communications or public affairs departments. Chances are, they are already aware of a number of impersonations and/or threats.

 

CTI teams need the right people, processes, and technology to effectively monitor social media for threats. CTI analysts responsible for this mission need to understand their organization very well, have a strong ability to understand other languages and cultures to understand the context of statements in social media, and have strong familiarity with various social media. Outside of the CTI team, there need to be identified stakeholders who support this effort and will take action when notified of a threat. To that end, there need to be established processes for all pertinent threat scenarios. For technology, many companies offer solutions that have the ability to continuously scan and monitor social media for various threat scenarios. Any tool that fulfills this mission must be able to handle the massive amount of data that is available on social media, possess the ability to search and do analysis in the tool, store data points for later analysis, share with other analysts, and, ideally, facilitate takedowns of certain social media sites or content that are clearly impersonating an organization’s brand and personnel.

 

What is the minimum?

For CTI, the following are the very minimum things that a CTI section should do regarding social media threats:

  1. Know what your organization’s social media assets are and who owns them. This means doing an assessment early on to know what official social media assets exist that officially represent the organization. It’s important also to know if the communications, marketing, public affairs, or HR departments own these profiles and how they are being secured. Who has access to alter the profile? Who can post content? Who is monitoring traffic? Similarly, the profiles for the organization’s VIPs – the C-suite / Secretary level personnel are very important to track as they are high value targets for impersonations.
  2. Know what other uncontrolled social media assets exist. In addition to the official and high value profiles, the other profiles that either do or could be considered as ‘officially representing the organization’ should also be tracked and monitored by the CTI team as their hijacking or impersonation can cause increased damage since it rarely (if ever) gets official attention.
  3. Establish a baseline for activity to detect account hijacking. What is the average traffic like from and to this profile? What content is normal and what is anomalous? Knowing these are important to quickly identifying a hijacked or impersonated account.
  4. Review (or establish) the appropriate use policy. Many organizations have an appropriate use policy in place that states what is acceptable and unacceptable use on social media. Few however find the right balance between being user-friendly and draconian. CTI can help organizations assess the organization specific threats and likelihood of the potential threat scenarios which help craft sound policy.
  5. Monitor for changes. CTI teams should monitor their social media assets of interest.  Monitoring is best done by establishing automated searches and then alerts that result from changes or spikes in activity. It is important for a CTI team to, at this point, have a good list of contacts in the event or a hijacking or impersonation. Additionally, it is important for the CTI team to know how to execute a take down on all the various social media providers. While all the major providers have an advertised method for requesting a takedown of an imposter account, this process is not always timely or easy. CTI can show real value here if they have contacts within the various social media providers to assist when possible and speed up the process.

 

Social media is a powerful medium for communication but organizations must be aware of the threats and risk inherent in social media to fully take advantage of the communication opportunities.

What are your experiences with CTI and social media threats? Let us know on Twitter and social media with the hashtag #INSAblog.

 

About the Author: Lincoln works as an information technology professional in the financial sector. He has over a decade of experience helping organizations understand the threats they face and make informed, risk based decisions.

INSA is the premier intelligence and national security organization that brings together the public, private and academic sectors to collaborate on the most challenging policy issues and solutions.

About the INSA Cyber intelligence task force: The INSA Cyber Intelligence Task Force was created to set the landscape for cyber intelligence by discussing why cyber intelligence is necessary and providing thoughts on how to develop this function in the cyber domain.

Standard
cyber intelligence, cybersecurity

Activity Based Intelligence (ABI), TAC, and the Cyber Domain

Date: 26 May, 2016
Author: E. R. “Mike” Anders, M.A., CCIP, CCII, CEH, C|HFI
© Copyright, 26 May 2016, All Rights Reserved

Argyle_20160503003539

Argyle Threat Research (TheBrain®: Mind Mapping Software: http://www.thebrain.com/)

Activity-based Intelligence (ABI) analyst are deeply immersed in data, as are other Intelligence Analysts. For ABI Analysts engaged in the Cyber fight, Transactions, Activity, and Correlations (TAC) tend to dominate. Former National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) Director, Letitia Long writes, “Activity-based Intelligence is defined as a discipline of intelligence where the analysis and subsequent collection are focused on the activity and transactions associated with an entity, a population or an area of interest.” Furthermore she says specifically, “These activities and transactions are not solely tied to geospatial actions, but also apply across the cyber, social, financial and commercial domains.”  For ABI Analysts working Cyber incidents TAC has a very purposeful meaning.(Long)

When users communicate over the Internet they are engaging in a “transaction” in the classic sense of ABI. One can argue that the “Three-way-handshake” that takes place between TC/IP devices communicate are themselves a “Transaction.” The “Activity” takes place according to communication protocols, or the “rules” of the Transaction, and the OSI model’s standardization of communication functions. Communication happens because protocols are followed, transactions initiated, data flows, and activity is terminated according to the rules. And everything happens at the speed of Cyber. The ABI analyst’s task is to detect, to identify, and to sort through these transactions and correlate them to activity in a way that makes sense of it all. The “Four Pillars” of ABI provide the foundation for doing precisely that.

Analyst trained in the ABI methodology are familiar with the terms “Geo-registration for Discovery,” “Data Neutrality,” “Sequence Neutrality,” and “Integration before Exploitation” as explained in great detail and with considerable clarity, in Patrick Biltgen and Stephan Ryan’s new book, “Activity Based Intelligence: Principles and Applications”. (Biltgen & Ryan, 2016) Transactions, Activity and Correlations are all given ample treatment, more than this blog can address. For the ABI analyst in the cyber arena, the “Four Pillars” open up the space for wider ranging analysis and offers the prospect of identifying, and even discovering “Unknown, unknowns” that may have significant consequences through the course of an investigation or counter-cyber campaign.

Cyberspace is a virtual World that resides within the physical World. NSA Director Adm. Rogers has remarked, “Every single cyber component has a physical geographic position on the face of the Earth.” Dual-hatted as commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Rogers says it is not enough to throw down a network schematic on a conference table, but rather “. . . show me where it is because there are lots of ways to try to understand things.” (USGIF, 2015) That is why Rogers has called for a closer relationship between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The “lots of ways” Adm. Rogers suggests is exactly what ABI is all about—even for cyber intelligence analysis, it is not just Log and Security file analysis, Pcap traces, and vulnerability reports. The requirement is all of that and more. Practitioners such as Chandler P. Atwood describe ABI’s Multi-INT approach to data as being “Transformational” in both impact and scope. (Atwood, 2015) Since ABI takes a Multi-INT/All Source approach to data collection, processing, and interpretation, analysts can build upon all “Four” pillars of ABI to solve CYBINT and Counter-CYBINT problems. The interplay of Transactions, Activity, and Correlations form a mosaic revealing the “who,” the “what,” and the “why” of suspicious computer network activity and malicious cyber campaigns

At the center of ABI is correlation—particularly so, with respect to Integration before Exploitation, one of the “Four Pillars” of ABI. (Biltgen & Ryan, 2016, pp. 255-256).  In fact, in the book on ABI, Biltgen and Ryan spend an entire chapter on correlation and data fusion. Both art and science are evident and intricately bound up in making the kind of associations, correlations, and relationships from data collected that lead to estimations and assessments in intelligence analysis. Correlation is key to understanding computer network activity as well.  Because ABI is all-source and multi-INT, cyber investigators benefit at multiple levels to include, but not limited to the physical network layer, the logical layer, and the cyber human persona layer—when it comes to countering targeted threat activity. (DoD, 2013)

ABI does not exist in analytical isolation. Object Based Production (OBP) provides a significant enhancement when combined with ABI techniques, and methods. According to Charlotte Shabarekh, the head of Analytics, Modeling, and Simulation at Aptima, Inc., “In Cyber, OBP is a challenging task due to spoofing or masking of IP addresses.  It’s necessary to perform “co-reference resolution” tasks to associate spoofed packets to the correct source address.” (Shabarekh, 2016) ABI can provide the required context to accurately perform data association in cyber networks.

Concluding, Tractions, Activity, and Correlations are primary drivers of ABI investigations and analysis. That does not, however, exclude other methodologies. Whether it is the “Diamond Model” or the “Cyber Kill-Chain” an ABI analyst has access to all sources and means to prosecute investigations and threat analysis. Being able to do so is a core concept and understanding of Activity Based Intelligence (ABI) in the Cyber Domain.

What are your experiences with ABI and TAC? Let us know on Twitter and social media with the hashtag #INSAblog.”

 

Works Referenced or Reviewed

Atwood, C. P. (2015, April 1). Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis. Retrieved from Joint Force Quarterly 77: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/581866/jfq-77-activity-based-intelligence-revolutionizing-military-intelligence-analys.aspx

Biltgen, P., & Ryan, S. (2016). Activity-Based Intelligence (ABI) Principles and Applications. Boston, MA: ARTECH House.

DoD. (2013). DTIC. Retrieved from Joint Publication 3-12 (R): http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf

Long, L. A. (Fall/Winter 2013). Activity Based Intelligence: Understanding the Unknown . The Intelligencer 20, no. 2, 7-15.

Shabarekh, C. (2016, May 26). Director Analytics, Modeling and Simulation Division, Aptima, Inc., http://www.aptima.com, (M. Anders, Interviewer)

USGIF. (2015, June 24). NSA Eyes Closer Ties to NGA. Retrieved from Trajectory: http://trajectorymagazine.com/got-geoint/item/1989-nsa-eyes-closer-ties-with-nga.html

About the Author: Mr. Anders is a Certified Cyber Intelligence Professional with an Intelligence/Counterintelligence skill-set developed over 30+ years of experience. He is also an award winning broadcast journalist for the 1984 radio series, “The KGB and the Washington Target!” that focused on the Kremlin’s campaign to collect intelligence on High-tech firms in the D.C. area.

 

INSA is the premier intelligence and national security organization that brings together the public, private and academic sectors to collaborate on the most challenging policy issues and solutions.

 

About the INSA Cyber intelligence task force: The INSA Cyber Intelligence Task Force was created to set the landscape for cyber intelligence by discussing why cyber

Intelligence is necessary and providing thoughts on how to develop this function in the cyber domain.

 

© Copyright, E. R. Anders

26 May 2016, All Rights Reserved

 

Standard
cyber intelligence

Activity Based Intelligence (ABI) and the Cyber Domain

By: E. R. “Mike” Anders, M.A., CCIP, CCII, CEH, C|HFI

Argyle_20160503003539

Argyle Threat Research (TheBrain®: Mind Mapping Software: http://www.thebrain.com/)

Activity-Based Intelligence (ABI) is an analytic methodology—tested by fire and war—in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Faced with the challenge of detecting, tracking and countering violent insurgent threats, particularly improvised explosive device (IED) networks and terrorist cells, intelligence analysts developed a “multi-INT” approach to the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of “actionable” intelligence (Long, 2013). Under the most trying of battlefield conditions, the foundations for ABI were laid. Threats from nation-state actors, and non-state actors, in the close context of the cyber arena, were also addressed (Riley, 2015). Technical advances in data processing and analysis has further added to the development of ABI techniques, practices, and recognized tradecraft.

The art and science of ABI is deeply involved in collecting data about transactions and correlating data to human behaviors and activity. ABI is concerned about transactions and activities involving an entity—including a person or an electronic device—, a population, or even some particular area of interest (Phillips, 2012). Activities can range from face-to-face meetings between individuals to the installation of malicious software on a victim’s computer. ABI is a “natural” fit for understanding diverse, complex threats, and malicious activity of covert cell-based organizations. Consequently, ABI tradecraft is well suited to countering the similar and growing cyber threat against computer networks, and systems.

ABI and Cyber is about human action and human interaction with the machine. According to ABI practitioners like Melanie Corcoran, with Analytic Fusions, “At the heart of it is behavior and intent. And also, having the ability to bring all the data in and make it relatable.”  The core concept is built upon “The Four Pillars” of ABI (Meyer, 2015).

Becoming comfortable with “The Four Pillars” of ABI can take some getting used to by intelligence analysts and non-intelligence analysts alike, who may be more familiar with traditional analytical methodologies. A better way might be to think organically instead of architecturally.

4 Pillars_20160509021940 (2)

(Based on “Terms of Reference,” (Military Operations Research Society, 2016)

ABI emphasis on geo-spatial, and temporal analysis may be troubling, perhaps not so much for the general analyst, but more so for the cyber analyst. Understanding Data Neutrality (one of the “Four Pillars”) can be a challenge to some steeped in the sensitive and secretive nature of government data classification requirements. Sequence Neutrality often must be accepted before an individual recognizes the full benefit. And lastly, Integration Before Exploitation can best be grasped by those in the trenches who are closest to the action and to the rapidly changing operational campaigns of persistent cyber threats and well-funded nation-state adversaries.

Clearly, ABI, and how it applies specifically to counter cyber security threats, is beginning to emerge from the shadows with the help of technical research and development—but slowly. Analytical tools like “Artemis” by Dark Data Services—still in development, but tested—are crawling the depths of the so-called “Dark Web” to accelerate the emergence (Amores, 2016). Other advances in super-computing to support “Big Data” analytics are additional drivers. How much, when, and to what extent ABI and cyber continue to converge remains a tantalizing vision of innovation and creativity on the far horizon.

What are your experiences with ABI and Cyber? Let us know on Twitter using @cyberintelblog and #cyberintel .

To contact the author or submit comments please email cyberthreatintelblog@gmail.com

 

Works Cited
Amores, R. (2016). Artemis and the “Dark Web”. (M. Anders, Interviewer)

Corcoran, M. (2016). ABI and Cyber. (M. Anders, Interviewer)

Long, L. A. (2013). ABI: Activity Based Intelligence: Understanding the Unknown. Retrieved from The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies: http://www.afio.com/publications/LONG_Tish_in_AFIO_INTEL
_FALLWINTER2013_Vol20_No2.pdf

Meyer, S. (2015, August 21). Activity Based Intelligence (ABI), Human Domain Analytics. Retrieved from LinkedIn: Pulse: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/international-awareness-seek-out-professionals-sam-meyer

Military Operations Research Society (MORS). (2016, January 26). Operations Research Methods for Activity Based Intelligence (ABI). Retrieved from A MORS Workshop: http://www.mors.org/Portals/23/Docs/Events/2016/ABI/2016-01-20%20MORS%20ABI%20Workshop%20Terms%20of%20Reference
%20rev%206.pdf

Phillips, M. (2012). A Brief Overview of Activity Based Intelligence and Human Domain Analytics. Retrieved from Trajectory: http://www.trajectorymagazine.com/civil/item/1369-human-domain-analytics.html

Riley, S. (2015, February 11). Insights to Modern Cyber Threat Intelligence. Retrieved February 12, 2015, from

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/insights-modern-cyber-threat-intelligence-shawn-riley

 

 

About the Author: Mike Anders is a Certified Cyber Intelligence Professional with an Intelligence/Counterintelligence skill-set developed over 30+ years. Mr. Anders is a member of INSA’s Cyber Intelligence Sub-Council

About INSA: INSA is the premier intelligence and national security organization that brings together the public, private and academic sectors to collaborate on the most challenging policy issues and solutions.

About the INSA Cyber Intelligence Sub-Council: The INSA Cyber Intelligence Sub-Council was created to set the landscape for cyber intelligence by discussing why cyber intelligence is necessary and providing thoughts on how to develop this function in the cyber domain.

 

Standard
cyber intelligence, cybersecurity

A Brief Overview of the Dark Web – Part 2: The Dark Web Dwellers

A Brief Overview of the Dark Web – Part 2: The Dark Web Dwellers

May 29, 2015

In the last blog article we looked at what the dark web is and why it matters to law enforcement and intelligence professionals. In this installment we will look at the actors and potential adversaries who use the dark web to conduct their business, along with efforts to de-anonymize dark web users. Jamie Bartlett has authored a book titled, The Dark Net, where he conducts in-depth interviews of dark web participants, and even orders cannabis on a dark market site using bitcoin. Bartlett conducts interviews of right-wing extremists, hackers, cypherpunks, pedophiles, porn stars, self-harmers and those dealing with eating disorders. These are the types of actors who inhabit the dark web and Bartlett does an excellent job introducing novices into this world. It is worth reading for anyone interested in how the dark web works and delving into the minds of adversaries (or people on the fringe of society). The main takeaway for law enforcement and intelligence professionals is that the dark web is an area worth targeting.

In this world, it is a cat and mouse game between those who break the law and those who enforce the law. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies must combine traditional and high-tech analytical and collection methodologies. In the case of the downfall of Silk Road 2, it appears from the criminal complaint that law enforcement used an undercover agent to infiltrate the operators of the site. HUMINT has been, and will continue to be, an imperative method of intelligence collection – even in the high-tech world. This is not to discount using technology as a collection platform. Tor has faults, as demonstrated by a professor at Columbia University who discovered more than 81 percent of Tor clients can be de-anonymized. Just as proliferation in an arms race, those who seek anonymity continue to find new ways to mask their internet presence, all while intelligence agencies and law enforcement seek to de-anonymize them. With the holes in Tor, researchers have built a new Tor client called Astoria, which is said to reduce the vulnerability of being de-anonymized down to 5.8 percent. This shows the dark web is here to stay. Those in the intelligence and law enforcement communities must remain cognizant of the latest technology, along with using traditional law enforcement and intelligence techniques to target those who use the dark web to conduct their business.

What are your experiences with Tor and the Dark Web? Let us know on Twitter and social media with the hashtag #INSAblog.

Standard